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Common Law Divorce
While the term "Common Law Divorce" is relatively new,
the practice which it describes is as old as the institution
of marriage. The thesis which it seeks to explain is a
simple one-!where there is a will, there is a way." A
married couple, or an individual partner to the marriage,
desirous of dissolving the relationship, will find a way of
so doing. The formalities of domestic relations law will not
deter parties from obtaining a divorce, but will only deter
them from obtaining a legal divorce. Where the latter is
difficult or expensive, desertion or "self-help" provides an
easy solution to the problem. Professor Foster, after a
thorough and foundational discussion of common law
marriage, explores the various methods used to provide
the "way out," the reasons for their use and the problems
which arise as a result of such use. He concludes that the
"do it yourself' method of obtaining a divorce has been
used much too extensively and that judges should be a
necessary and even an interested party in a divorce action.
Although you may not contemplate a divorce, for yourself
or for a client, the area does lend itself to interesting
articles. Read on!
Henry H. Foster, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
A number of years ago an Austrian law professor named Eugen
Ehrlich became interested in what he called the "living law" of a
community, as distinguished from the law which was enforced in
the courts.' In studying the customs of peasants he found that the
Austrian Civil Code was but a shell filled with the varying con-
tent of "living law" which in reality dominated life even though it
was not formalized into legal precepts. Gerhard Mueller perform-
ed a similar service for Anglo-American law by documenting what
in fact occurred in England during the period from 1660 to 1857
*Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
1. For a brief description of Ehrlich and his contributions to sociologicaljurisprudence, see PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE 79-82 (1953). For Ehrlich's
leading work printed in English, see ERLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Moll transl. 1936).
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when presumably there existed a "divorceless" society.2 He found
that large segments of the population persisted in self-divorce; that
ministers of dissenting sects frequently performed illegal marriage
ceremonies and awarded extra-legal divorces, and that desertion
was the most common way of terminating marital dissatisfaction.
It should not be too surprising that the most intimate of human
relationships-marriage-has both a public and a private aspect
and that there may be different levels of legal, religious, and social
validity and significance. Self-interest engenders self-help when
satisfaction cannot be obtained through regular channels, and if
the law obstructs and religion inhibits, either custom will arise to
compete, or legal and religious institutions will adapt in fact, if not
in theory, to answer pressing human needs.3 Such has been our
history both as to the formalities of marriage and its termination.
Although much has been written about so-called common law
marriages, whatever that term may include, insufficient attention
has been paid to informal or irregular divorce which is so wide-
spread that by analogy it may be called "common law divorce."4
The latter is as much a social reality as private or clandestine
marriage. They have a common pattern of private action without
benefit of clergy-or law.
A. COMMON LAW MARRiAGES
In order to determine whether the above analogy is apt, it is
necessary to summarize briefly and explain what is meant by
"common law marriage." It was not until the Council of Trent in
the mid-sixteenth century that church and state proscribed private
marriage and required an officiant for its validity. Even then, as
now, church doctrine held that in reality the parties themselves per-
fected the marriage although it must be in the presence of ecclesi-
astical authority. For centuries before the Council of Trent, the
2. Mueller, Inquiry Into the State of a Divorceless Society, 18 U. PrrT.
L. REV. 545 (1957).
3.
In fact, whenever a rule of law lay across the path of human progress,
or failed to give an adequate satisfaction for human needs, we may
feel reasonably sure that human progress and human wants have found
their way under its barrier by means of legal fiction or around it by
equity. They have flowed over it sometimes in the form of legislation,
but the barrier has rarely been so high and so strong in our race as to
cause a pressure sufficient to result in revolution.
Page, Professor Ehrlich's Czernowitz Seminar of Living Law, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERIcAN LAW SCHOOLS 46, 68 (reprint
1914); HALL, READINGS IN JtURISPRUDENCE 825, 834 (1938).
4. The author is indebted to Virginia S. Jordan for both the label "com-
mon law divorce" and many of the examples cited herein. Mrs. Jordan is a
practicing lawyer at Tampa, Florida, and formerly was in charge of the
Legal Aid Society in that city.
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church had concentrated its attention upon establishing prohibited
degrees of consanguinity and affinity, and promoting the doctrine
of the sacramental character of marriage and its indissolubility.5
The church, for a long period, was satisfied if the parties sought a
blessing for their union after a private ceremony.6 For some time
before the Council of Trent, however, the church had insisted upon
the presence of a priest at the marriage ceremony. His absence
gave rise to ecclesiastical penalties such as penance, but did not
impair the validity or efficacy of the private ceremony.7
The Council of Trent set the rule of legality for Catholic coun-
tries, and thereafter private informal marriages became a legal nul-
5. The origin of the doctrine that marriage is a sacrament is attributed
to Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, who lived between 354-430 A.D. However,
it was not until the second half of the twelfth century that the doctrine
was thoroughly established in the western church. In 1164 in the fourth
book of Peter Lombard's Sentences, we find the first clear recognition of
the "seven sacraments," among which marriage appears. These were ap-
proved by the Council of Florence in 1439 and later by the Council of
Trent (1543-1563). Another important development was the requirement
of publication of banns of marriage, promulgated by the Lateran Council
of 1215. The Reformation brought with it a denial of the sacramental char-
acter of marriage, although John Calvin did concede that marriage was
,tan institution of God." Martin Luther proposed that absolute divorce be
granted for adultery and malicious desertion, and in 1560 those two grounds
were incorporated into the law of Scotland. There is some evidence that
during the reign of Elizabeth a few divorce decrees were issued which gave
express permission to remarry, but a decision of the Star Chamber in
1602 put an end to such practice.
6. 1 HowARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONs 298-309
(1904), in describing the "bride mass" and the historical development of
ecclesiastical marriages, points to four stages in such development: (1)
During the first four centuries no liturgy was prescribed, the ancient forms
of contract were accepted, nuptials were usually celebrated at the home of
the bride, less often in the church, and "the priestly benediction, though
doubtless commended as a religious duty, was not exacted by the church
as essential to a legal or canonical marriage." (2) Between about the end
of the fourth century and the middle of the tenth, it became traditional
after a marriage to seek a priestly benediction and partake a sacrament,
this leading to the "bride mass" which was the genesis of the ecclesiastical
marriage liturgy. (3) Between the tenth and the twelfth centuries, an elabo-
rate and imposing ritual was developed, the priest officiating at ceremonies
before the church door and at the bridal mass within the church itself. (4)
By the thirteenth century the ecclesiastical marriage involving gifta by the
priest was in effect throughout Europe.
7. After the Norman Conquest, more stringent measures were taken to
secure publicity and to enforce the observance of religious rites, without,
however, going to the extent of declaring the unblessed marriage invalid.
For example, the constitution of Archbishop Lanfranc, alleged to have
been enacted by the Council of Westminster in 1076, declared the unbless-
ed marriage to be "fornication." In 1102, at the council of London, an
attempt was made by Anselm to check clandestine contracts by the declar-
ation that "Promises of marriage made between men and women without
witnesses are null if either party deny them." HOWARD, op. cit. supra note
6, at 312-15.
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lity. England, however, did not proscribe informal marriages for
the next two hundred years, although during the Reformation
both England and other Protestant countries asserted state control
over marriage and divorce. Lord Hardwicke's Act in 1753, how-
ever, required that marriage banns be published and that the cere-
mony be performed by a parish priest, except for Quakers and
Jews. Dissenting sects flouted the law until its amendment in 1836,
and it is estimated that at least one-third of all English marriages
were illegal.8
Until the middle of the eighteenth century, there were, in theory,
three different relationships between possible marriage partners,
each of which involved different legal consequences. The parties,
if married in facie ecclesiae, were regarded as validly married by
the king's courts, the ecclesiastical tribunals and the church, and
by society. In theory, such a marriage could be terminated only by
death or what came to be called annulment (due to impediments
existing at the time of marriage) 9 or by act of Parliament. As a
practical matter, the latter was a form of relief limited to nobility
of great wealth."0 Informal, irregular, clandestine, or so-called
common law marriages contracted without benefit of clergy, enter-
ed into by the parties themselves, although generally regarded as
being on a plane of parity with church marriages, did have certain
legal disadvantages such as proof of right to dower." In addition
8. I ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE LAWS OF MARRIAGE, Report, xxi-xxiii
(1868). In 1811, there were 2655 Churches of the Establishment as against
3451 dissenting Chapels. Throughout the period 1753-1836 non-comform-
ists persisted in rejecting ceremonies in the established church.
9. Technically, annulments were brought by the aggrieved person during
the lifetime of both spouses on grounds which made the marriage voidable,
whereas declarations of nullity, based upon so-called diriment impediments
which made the marriage void, could be brought at any time and asserted
in any proceedings.
10. Mueller, supra note 2, at 550-51, estimates that Parliamentary di-
vorce cost from £600 to £1,000, and that in 1688 the average annual in-
come of the temporal lords was £2,800; that of baronets £880; that of es-
quires and gentlemen respectively £450 and £280; that of shopkeepers
and tradesmen £45; that of artisans and handicrafts £40; that of laboring
people and out-servants £15; that of common soldiers £14, and that of cot-
tagers and common paupers £6 s 10. Between 1715-1775 Parliament pass-
ed 60 bills of divorcement; between 1775-1800, 74 such bills were pass-
ed; and between 1800-1836, approximately 80-90 bills were passed. The
first undisturbed parliamentary divorce was granted in 1668, over ecclesias-
tical objections, to Lord Roos. The first attempt at Parliamentary divorce
occurred during the reign of Henry VIII in the Marquis of Northampton's
case, but that act was set aside a year later when Queen Mary ascended
the throne. The ecclesiastical authorities thought they had settled the mat-
ter once and for all against such power on the part of Parliament in Rye v.
Fullcumbe, Noy 100, 74 Eng. Rep. 1066 (1601), which held void a re-
marriage after a Parliamentary divorce.
11. See 2 PoLLocK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 374-75
[Vol. 46:43
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to these two forms of marriage, meretricious relationships were not
uncommon and gave some semblance of marriage. In particular, it
was difficult to distinguish between common law marriage and a
meretricious relationship, informality and the lack of registration or
public act being an indicia of each. The notorious "Fleet Mar-
riages"--performed by disreputable parsons who were outside the
jurisdiction of the bishop-further complicated matters because
ostensibly the drunken marriages were in facie ecclesiae.'
Thus, there was extreme difficulty in distinguishing the above
relationships and in determining the facts upon which status de-
pended. So far as common law marriages were concerned, other
impractical distinctions pertained. If the couple exchanged con-
sent per verba de praesenti they were married ipso facto, but if
their promises were exchanged per verba de futuro, they were
merely betrothed. Betrothal, however, involved certain duties and
responsibilities. 3 Moreover, even though the words were "de
(2d ed. 1898), where comment is made about the common law requirement
that for dower the endowment must have occurred at the church door,
whereas ecclesiastical tribunals were satisfied with less in the way of for-
mality. The apparent anomaly is explained in terms of the court's concern
with evidentiary proof that a marriage actually took place and the assump-
tion that a ceremony at the door would have such publicity as to consti-
tute good proof.
12. The so-called "Fleet Marriages" were quite common and had be-
come a national disgrace in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is
reported that one Fleet parson, operating at the gates of the prison, aver-
aged about 6000 "services" a year. The cost for such services varied ac-
cording to the means of bride and groom, but it might be as low as the
price of a dram of gin. See Mueller, supra note 2, at 558 and au-
thorities cited therein. MAcQUEEN, DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL JURIS-
DICTION 2 (1858), states that even after Lord Hardwicke's Act, mar-
riages without banns, performed by so-called "hedge parsons" were com-
mon and far more numerous than marriages in facia ecclesiae. Thus, al-
though "Fleet marriages" may have been eliminated to some extent by
Lord Hardwicke's Act, that Act's requirement of license, banns, and cere-
mony in the parish by the established church, was disregarded by Catholics,
dissenters, and many others.
13. For example, although espousals made for children might be repudi-
ated for any reason when they reached marriagable age, the betrothal of
adults could be broken only for just and reasonable cause, otherwise ec-
clesiastical penalties might be incurred. See POWELL, ENGLISH DOMESTIC
RELATIONS LAW 1487-1653, at 3-4 (1917). Examples of public espousals
occur in Twelfth Night, V, 1, and in The Taming 9f the Shrew, III, 2.
"After spousals, the engaged couple might call each other 'husband' and
'wife', although they were not really so. Thus Olivia calls Cesario (mistaking
him for Sebastian) 'husband', and lifewise Petruchio calls Katherine 'wife'
and Baptista 'father.' " Id. at 4-5. Moreover, annulment might be had for
precontract where an engagement was unilaterally breached without good
cause and the jilter married another. Since spinsterhood in the middle ages
might result in commitment to a church institution, it was tremendously
important from the woman's point of view that marriage follow engage-
ment. It should be noted also that the distinction between betrothal and
1961]
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futuro," if the engaged couple had sexual relations ("de futuro
cum copulo") the engagement was converted into a marriage. This
was done on the interesting theological theory that the pair must
have intended immediate marriage rather than sin. The assumption
behind all this, apparently, was that romantic couples in tense situ-
ations are perspicacious concerning tenses!
There is no record of the cum copulo doctrine being accepted
in the colonies or in the United States, although a private contract
of marriage was legally acceptable, and in New England marriage
was regarded as a matter for civil authority. Two different theories
emerged as the common law form of marriage developed in the
United States. One theory was that it is cohabitation and reputa-
tion as man and wife that established the relationship. The other
was that such factors are merely some evidence of a prior exchange
of vows creating the relationship, but that such an exchange must
have occurred and additional evidence may be required. 4 It may
be more difficult to prove a common law marriage where the latter
rule prevails. Moreover, the rule that a relationship which was
meretricious in its inception will be presumed to continue as such,
compounds the difficulty of proof. In short, although some 15
states still recognize private agreement to become man and wife
immediately as a lawful form of marriage, 5 no license or civil or
religious ceremony being prerequisite, it has become increasingly
difficult to prove the contract. Hence, by judicial decision, and in
the absence of statutory abolition of common law marriages, many
if not most of the 15 states which retain that form of marriage have
in effect contracted the area of valid marriages and expanded the
area of meretricious relationships. Whether or not this construction
is in accord with the actual intent of the parties will be discussed
later.
marriage was not always clear since it might hinge on subtle factors such
as subjective intent. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 11, at
365.
14. For a somewhat misleading discussion of this distinction, see Grigsby
v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S.W. 1124 (1913). It should be noted that some
states, such as Massachusetts, rejected the concept of common law marriage
and from the start required a public ceremony. For example, see Inhabitants
of Milford v. Inhabitants of Worcester, 7 Mass. 48 (1810), which held that
the marriage ceremony must be performed by an ordained minister or a jus-
tice of the peace.
15. As of 1960, the following jurisdictions retained common law mar-
riage: Alabama, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Texas. See chart prepared on Divorce, Annulment,
and Separation, by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association(1960).
[Vol. 46:43
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B. ABUSES OF DIVORCE LAW
Just as love or expediency will find a way around dogma or the
law, parties to an intolerable marriage will find a way out of the
marriage. If nothing else, there will be a de facto termination of
the relationship, and, if it subsists de jure, it will be drained of all
its vitality and meaning. We all know what it is that hell hath no
fury like. The cuckolded or misunderstood (or, perhaps, too-well-
understood) husband has been an inspiration to dramatists from
Athens to the present hour. Long suffering in the bonds of acri-
mony may be a duty we seek to impose on others, but the victim of
marital strife, unless he (or she) be a masochist, is apt to seek a
way out of holy deadlock. This is especially true in a culture where
the pursuit of sexual and marital happiness has become a primary
value if not an inalienable right. On the one hand, today's empha-
sis is upon the privileges, rights, and satisfactions of marriage,
rather than upon duty, responsibility, and a stoical acceptance of
the worse with the better. This leads to a sentimental and romantic
over-emphasis upon physical love which, as often as not, culmin-
ates in disillusionment, frustration, or malcontent when the hon-
eymoon comes to an end. Compromise is the only way for marital
co-existence and too few are prepared to accept it without bitter-
ness or a sense of defeat. On the other hand, the genuinely success-
ful marriages of today embody a relationship which throughout
history has been enjoyed by but few peoples in rare places. For if
the pursuit of marital happiness is successful, the result is a full
partnership in every sense of the term and a sharing on all levels
of existence. Today we expect too much of marriage, but when
those expectations are gratified, excellence has been achieved.
To the sociologist the meaningful inquiry is not into the causes
of a high divorce rate but into the factor of marriage stability. Al-
though divorce may be denied, as in Catholic countries, it by no
means follows that there is stability. Research under the supervi-
sion of Max Rheinstein indicates there is a high incidence of broken
homes in Catholic Italy; that desertion is common and concubinage
and prostitution flourish, but in fact there is greater stability than
in neighboring provinces in Switzerland. 6 The availability of di-
16. See Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage
Stability, 9 VANiD. L. REv. 633, 635 (1956), where reference is made to the
comparative law studies undertaken under Professor Rheinstein's direction.
Incomplete and preliminary reports indicate that a comparison between
Como Province in Italy and Ticino Canton in Switzerland, both of which
are 95 per cent Catholic and have similar economic conditions and popu-
lations but different divorce laws, shows that there were about twice as
many cases of family breakdown on the Swiss side but their number in
1961]
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vorce appears to be something of a factor contributing to the per-
centage of broken homes, but it is by no means true that the ab-
sence of divorce insures martial stability. Rheinstein's research in
Germany indicates that social and economic conditions, such as
war and depressions, have a closer relation to family stability than
legislation which permits, forbids, or limits divorce as a form for
terminating marriage.17
In England, before the Norman Conquest, divorce had evolved
from a patriarchal society where it had been available at the whim
of the husband, to the stage where the wife could terminate the
marriage at will."' After The Conqueror established the ecclesias-
tical courts in 1086, and with the advent of feudalism, women
were deprived of equal rights and became subordinate again. Loss
of legal status, disability and incapacity as to legal rights, subju-
gation to marriage rights of the lord, theological questioning as to
whether or not she could have a soul, these were the afflictions
visited upon wives and women by feudalism and the church. 9
Italy was not negligible. Unfortunately Rheinstein's research has not
as yet been published and this information was communicated orally at an
international meeting of family law people in Chicago in 1957.
17. Dr. Rheinstein in his report to the Conference on Marriage Stability
on the International Association of Legal Science at Chicago in September,
1957, stated that his preliminary findings indicated specific legislation had
less effect upon the divorce rate than other factors. For example, the di-
vorce rate dropped sharply in Germany during World War I but had a
dramatic increase in the immediate post war period, then leveled off and
had a sharp rise in 1934 after Hirer came into power. Apparently, extreme
changes in social and political conditions affect the divorce rate and if di-
vorce is obtainable there is a more marked difference in its rate between
rural and urban areas than between Catholic and non-Catholic areas.
18. See Dooms No. 79-81 of Aethelbert, reprinted in I ANCIENT LAws
AND INSTITUTIONS OF ENGLAND 23-25 (1840), which as to a wife pro-
vide "if she wish to go away with her child, let her have half the prop-
erty. If the husband wish to have them, (let her portion be) as one child.
If she bear no child, let paternal kindred have the 'fioh' and the 'morgen-
gyfe.' "
19. POWELL, ENGLISH DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 1487-1653 (1917),
gives a clear picture of the legal and social status of women during the
middle ages. He cites one authority as follows:
"A Good Woman (as an old Philosopher observeth) is but like one
Ele [eel] put in a bagge amongst 500 Snakes, and if a man should
have the luck to grope out that one Ele [eel] from all the snakes,
yet he hath at best But a wet ele [eel] by the taile; and he that
wedds himself to one fair . .. and if one beautifull and, never so
Vertuous, yet let him think this he wedds but a woman, and there-
fore a necessary evil."
Id. at 147. Bishop Alymer, in a sermon before Queen Elizabeth, admitted
that some women were superior to some men, but claimed that the major-
ity were otherwise.
"Women are of two sorts, some of them wiser, better learned, dis-
creeter, and more constant than a number of men; but another and
[Vol. 46:43
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The deification of Mary in the twelfth century was accompanied
by a debasement of women. It had become a man's world.
Although the ecclesiastical courts eventually evolved the dogma
that marriage was indissoluble, there were several practical ways
out for a disgruntled husband. The tables of consanguinity and
affinity were expanded to such an extent that in rural areas, or be-
tween members of the same social class, annulment was a con-
venient escape hatch.20 Moreover, precontract or a prior espousal
to another before marriage might be grounds for an annulment,
and even prenuptial sex relations with someone else might invali-
date a subsequent marriage.2' In short, annulment or a declara-
tion of nullity was readily available to the upper classes and fre-
quently was resorted to even though, after the fourteenth century,
it operated ab initio and consequently bastardized children.22
a worse sort of them, and the most part, are fond, foolish, wanton
fibbergibs, tatlers, triflers, wavering, witless, without council, feeble,
careless, rash, proud, dainty, nice, talebearers, evesdroppers, rumor-
raisers, eviltongued, worse-minded, and in every way soltified with
the dregs of the devil's dunghill."
Ibid. Powell cites another authority as follows: "Deponares having tasted
the martyrdoms of marriage, said, that there were but two good days in
all the life of marriage, the one was the wedding day, and the other the
day the woman dieth." Id. at 153. John Donne in one of his sermons
said that it would be a sin for one to love his wife as he does his mistress.
Id. at 178. The fact that Adam was made first and Eve second, she from
Adam but he from divine materials, was one of the arguments relied upon
in the disparagement of women. Powell concludes:
There can be no doubt that the belief in women's physical and men-
tal limitations is far older than Christianity, but that she was morally
weak seems to be the particular contributon of the early church fa-
thers to an unjust and undignified conception in which womanhood
was held during the middle ages and later times.
Id. at 148-49. He admits, however, that the prestige and influence of
Queen Elizabeth did much to improve the esteem in which women were
held, and says that conditions improved with the enlightenment of the
Renaissance and the teachings of the Puritans after the Reformation.
20. The prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity were increased
through the years until they reached the seventh degree. See Mueller,
supra note 2, at 554-57. With the Reformation their number was de-
creased. In addition to the marital misadventures of Henry VIII, perhaps
the most famous controversy between ecclesiatical authority and royalty
over impediments and degrees was that involving Eleanor of Aquitaine,
whose marriage to Louis VII of France was annulled, but whose marriage
to Henry II of England she could not terminate, even though her relation-
ship with Henry was within closer degrees than that with Louis.
21. Precontract, or prior betrothal to another, historically was one of
the most common grounds for annulment, i.e., if either had before mar-
riage been engaged to another, the marriage could be annulled. Moreover,
a marriage to the sister of one's mistress was regarded as incestuous, and
on this ground the marriage of Henry Vm to Anne Boleyn was annulled
because her sister Mary had been a mistress of the King. See POWELL,
op. cit. supra note 19, at 207.
22. POWELL, op. cit. supra note 19, at 8, says
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From about the fifteenth century, divorce a mensa et thoro, or
from bed and board, did not legally terminate the marriage but
constituted a legal separation.23 However, there is substantial evi-
dence that husbands in particular remarried after bed and board
decrees and that such practice was widespread. Strype writing
about marriage and divorce during the reign of Henry VIII, ob-
serves that "Noblemen would very frequently put away their wives
and marry others if they like another woman better or were like to
obtain wealth by her. And they would sometimes pretend their
wives to be false to their beds and so be divorced and married
again as they pleased."2
With the Reformation came a tightening up of ecclesiastical law,
a decrease in the number of prohibited degrees of consanguinity
and affinity, and an attempt to eliminate some of the rampant
abuses. The canons of 1603 sought to achieve such objectives by
requiring husbands to post security against remarriage after a bed
and board decree. The result of this requirement was noted by
Godolphin, who reports:
By enjoying such security to be given, and such bonds to be taken,
this seems to be a penal canon, viz. pecuniarily penal; whoever there-
fore breaks the law incurs the penalty, and whoever suffers the pen-
alty, doth answer and satisfy the law, which before he had infringed.25
In other words, by forfeiting the bond, the legally separated but
undivorced spouse paid in full and was free of any legal sanction
if he remarried! Apparently, such conduct was socially and legally
acceptable, although inheritance rights must have been based upon
the first marriage.
Conset, whose second edition of Ecclesiastical Courts appeared
in 1700, spoke at length of the perennial fraud and collusion in
divorce cases and, like Godolphin, referred to the frequent abuse
of bed and board decrees. He says:
Up to 1337, children were not bastardized if their parents had mar-
ried in ignorance of an existing impediment. After that date, both
civil and church law held them to be illegitimate if a divorce was ob-
tained; otherwise they were legitimate, although legal grounds for
divorce actually existed.
23. There is considerable conflict in historical writings about divorce
and annulment because what we now call "annulment" was at various times
called "divorce." By the seventeenth century. however, Coke could say that
marriage could be dissolved only by death or "divorce," i.e., under the
terminology of the time, judgment of nullity. See 2 CoKE, INSTITUTES § 380;
CoKE, ANTIQUITIES AND LAWS OF ENGLAND 33 (3d ed., 1771).
24. POWELL, op. cit. supra note 19, at 64. In 1610, Edmund Bunny
published his OF DIVORCE, written in 1595, and commented upon the fre-
quency of remarriage after divorce a mensa et thoro.
25. POWELL, op. cit. supra note 19, at 87.
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Also to avoid these second Marriages, whilst the former Husband or
Wife are alive (being a thing frequently done) the Judges are wont ex-
pressly to Inhibit these Persons thus Separated [from bed and board],
that they do not betake themselves to any other Marriage, with any
other Persons, during the lives of them two thus Separated, with an
admonition also, that they abide Unmarried, unless they be mutually
reconciled to each other. And as often as it is complained of these
second Marriages (of either of these parties thus Separate), before the
King's Chief Commissioners in Ecclesiastical Causes, or before the
Judges of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Parties who offend in
these cases, are punished and Corrected, and are Divorced and Sep-
arated from these second Marriages, or rather from these adulterous
Wedlocks. 26
Although Godolphin's observation that forfeiture of security was
full satisfaction seems to have gone by the boards by Conset's
time, it should be noted that Conset is careful to state that penalty
and declaration of the invalidity of the second marriage might
occur where the matter was "complained of." Further, he states
that remarriage after a bed and board decree was a "thing fre-
quently done."27
Conset's reports on custom as contrasted with law are corrobo-
rated by Ayliffe who bitterly denounced the prevalent abuses of
marriage and divorce law. The latter was especially critical of the
civil law and what he regarded as lax grounds for divorce and
annulment.28
In addition to the fraud, collusion, perjury, and corruption that
blighted matrimonial actions before the ecclesiastical tribunals,
bills of divorcement in Parliament often had an unsavory aura.
For a brief period during Oliver Cromwell's reign, ecclesiastical
jurisdiction was suspended and divorces were granted by magis-
trates. The ecclesiastical courts, however, resumed their traditional
jurisdiction with the Restoration. Fabrication of grounds for an-
26. CONSET, ECCLESIASTICAL CouRTs 279 (2d ed. 1700). Conset also
points out that pretence of adultery and fabrication of other grounds was
frequent and admonished judges to require corroboration by disinterested
witnesses and not to rely upon unsupported statements. Id. at 279-80.
27. Ibid.
28. AYLiFFE, PARERGON JuRis CONONIcI ANGLICANI 225-26 (2d ed.
1734), says:
By the ancient Civil-Law the Reasons or Causes for rescinding Matri-
mony were various and several: So that a 'Wife might be divorc'd and
put away from her Husband even for evil Manners, viz. If she got
Drunk every Day, piss'd a bed every Night, or committed any other
Filthy Actions. But, this Case of a Divorce for ill Manners being re-
pealed, Justinian introdue'd several Causes of a Divorce less Arbi-
trary: But, these being also slight and frivolous, they are not now
deem'd with us a sufficient Cause for rescinding of Matrimony law-
fully contracted.
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nulment or bed and board divorce was not uncommon, and the
most celebrated early case on record is that of Lord Audley, who
in 1631 was accused and convicted of lenocinium (accessoryship
to his wife's adultery) and was beheaded.29
In addition to the perversion of the legal and legislative pro-
cesses, which was generally the escape route of persons of sub-
stance, desertion, self-divorce, or extra-legal divorce by ministers of
dissenting sects, or according to local custom, were the ways out
for the common man. It is important to note that the first metro-
politan police department in the world was that established by Sir
Robert Peel (hence the nickname "bobbies") in London in 1829.
Before then it was relatively easy to lose one's self in London or
some other urban center, and disappear without leaving a trace.
Legal status for those without property meant nothing, and rights
of inheritance were theoretical where there was little or nothing to
transmit. Some groups, such as the street vendors of London, had
their own private customs outside the law which governed all
matrimonial matters."0 And in rural England, wife sales occurred
at county fairs, until well into the nineteenth century, the wives be-
ing sold and the rights thereto assigned as though they were cat-
tle.31
In light of our above heritage from English law and custom,
it is small wonder that modem America has been unable to eradi-
cate, even if we really want to, the abuse and corruption of cen-
turies. It is most satisfactory-to have one's cake and to eat it too
if the trick can be done. The relatively strict divorce codes of our
states satisfy our clergy and moralists, and the liberal interpreta-
tion of substance and procedure by our courts gives a practical
way out. Thus our ambivalence is reflected in the law and its ad-
ministration. This gap between the letter of the law and its applica-
tion, and the competition between law and custom, is not a recent
development, but, as has been shown, such has been an omnipres-
29. Lord Audley's Case, 3 St. Tr. 401 (1631).
30. Mueller, supra note 2, at 565. He relies upon MAYmEw, LoNDON
LABoR AND THE LONDON PooR (1862). Mueller also reports that among
London costermongers concubinage among persons of all ages was the rule
and marriage the exception, and quotes from a brochure by a clergyman
published in 1700 stating that there were many reasons in addition to
adultery for leaving a wife or "send[ing] her packing." Id. at 563.
31. Id. at 566-72. Amazing as it may seem, quotations of market prices
for wives were published in the London Times in the nineteenth century.
Ashton, whose book Old Times (1885), relied on by Mueller, is cited as
having reported that as late as 1882 there was wife selling in rural England
and that during that year one wife was sold for a glass of ale and an-
other for a penny and a dinner. This custom is related by Thomas Hardy
in his novel, The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886)
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ent characteristic of the social control of marriage and divorce in
Anglo-American history. In 1832, Judge. Hitchcock of Ohio ob-
served:
Perhaps there is no statute in Ohio more abused than the statute con-
cerning "divorce and alimony." Perhaps there is no statute under
which greater imposition is practiced upon the court and more injus-
tice is done to individuals. . . .The hearings are generally ex parte.
Witnesses are examined, friendly to the applicant, and it is almost, if
not utterly impossible, for the court in most instances to arrive at
the real truths of the case. . . .But of the great multitude of cases
which are before this court I am confident that by far the greater num-
ber are not [meritorious].3 2
The American Bar Association in 1879, early in its existence,
deplored the evils inherent in divorce law and recommended a
uniform law for adoption in the states. The first bill proposing a
federal law of divorce was introduced in Congress in 1884. In
1905, the American Bar Association proposed an "Act on Divorce
Procedure" which was approved by an inter-church conference. A
year later the governor of Pennsylvania called a national confer-
ence at which a model divorce act 3 was drafted. James Bryce,
after his visit to America, wrote of our divorce problem and point-
ed out that the main difference between divorce at will under Ro-
man Law and the actual divorcement in modem American states
was that in the latter the courts must be invoked to do the job.
He then cautioned: "But where the courts out of good-nature or
carelessness make a practice of complying with the application of
one party, unresisted or feebly resisted by the other, the difference
almost disappears."34
Although Judge Hitchcock and James Bryce, and even the
American Bar Association, recognized the abuses and evils which
historically have been ubiquitous in matrimonial causes, they shed
little light upon the source of the evil and the incitement to abuse.
The matrimonial cause, particularly as it has been handed down to
us, inevitably lends itself to abuse because of the form in which it
is heard and the issues which have become crucial. Inevitably? We
should say inexorably! The justification for the adversary procedure
and the premise behind it is that adversaries will appear and there
will be a contest. In fact, ninety odd per cent of American di-
32. Harter v. Harter, 5 Ohio 318, 319-20 (1.832).
33. See Alexander, The Follies of Divorce--A Therapeutic Approach to
the Problem, 1 U. ILL. L.F. 695, 696 (1949).
34. BRYCE, Marriage and Divorce Under Roman and English Law, in
STuDms IN HisTORY AND JURSPRUDENCE 782, at 833 (1901), reprinted
in 3 SELEcT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEG_4AL HIsToRY 782, 829 (1909).
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vorces are uncontested.35 The parties, having reached a financial
and other settlement, short-circuit the law. One party, or perhaps
only his counsel, appears before a judge who frequently, and in a
perfunctory way, rubber stamps the decree. In urban areas, at
least, such is typical. There is no real effort to discern actual facts,
no probing for truth.
Tied-in with the structural form of the court and its proceedings
is the matter of statutory grounds which do not reflect actual causes
of family breakdown but seize upon symptoms thereof. In most
states, a divorce decree, in theory at least, is awarded to the inno-
cent and injured spouse and imposed upon the guilty partner. Even
if the institutional structure was conducive to discovery of truth,
"fault" is a will-o-the-wisp that is most elusive, especially in matri-
monial matters. The temptation for client and counsel to stretch
things a bit is almost irresistable, and in a sense, the law makes
liars or perjurers out of hurt and bewildered people.
The lesson of history is clear. The moralistic or theological ap-
proach is impractical, unworkable, and ill-suited to matrimonial
law. It is negative, destructive, has sacrificed viable marriages,
and in fact punished the innocent and rewarded the guilty. The
issue should be: can this marriage be saved? What help should be
extended? If reconciliation is impossible, impracticable, or danger-
ous, what plans can be formulated for the future?
Perhaps it is time to pause to ask, what has all this to do with
"common law divorce?" Simply this: the historic framework for
matrimonial causes, procedural and substantive law, and the cor-
ruption and abuses necessarily involved in its administration, have
created widespread disrespect for law. Further, they have indirect-
ly weakened the efficacy of other means of social control such as
religion and the pressure of public opinion. In its operation, mar-
riage and divorce law have discriminated for different social classes
and against them.3" In England, Parliamentary divorce was avail-
35. The figure "ninety odd per cent" is an informed guess based upon
experience and research but there are no statistics available to confirm or
refute this estimate. Obviously, the percentage of contested cases varies
from state to state and perhaps between urban and rural areas, but in
all jurisdictions the rate is exceedingly high.
36.
It is pityful to think of the four hundred years of misery and injustice
under which the citizens of this country have suffered in matters re-
lating to divorce. . . . [I]f you were a peer with a naughty wife,
you got an Act of Parliment passed to divorce her. It was an expen-
sive proceeding and, incidently, of doubtful legality. But the eugenics
of nobility and the purity of breed in the peerage made some such ma-
chinery necessary, and so you had "An Act for Lord Roos to marry
again," and others similarly entitled. Only the very rich at the rate of
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able only for extremely wealthy noblemen, divorce a mensa et
thoro was a possible remedy for the well-to-do, and an annulment
or decree of nullity was beyond the means of the average English-
man." Self-help was the only practical alternative for the latter.
Moreover, clandestine marriages were entered into not only by dis-
senters, but also by those who could not afford to pay high li-
cense fees or wished to avoid them." In large measure, English
law priced itself out of the market, whereas in Scotland divorce
was available for the ordinary man.39
Today, in the United States, the same factors (which impaired,
if they did not destroy, the efficacy of English matrimonial law)
are at work undermining our law of marriage and divorce. In
many areas divorce is a luxury beyond the means of the poor, and
even the cost of a marriage license may seem excessive. Desertion,
merely "calling it quits," or some other form of "common law di-
vorce" may be the practical alternative. It is an interesting com-
mentary upon our law that the number of desertions each year
two or three a year could avail themselves of this procedure, and, of
course, the very poor had not a look in at all.
PARRY, THE LAW AND THE POOR 126, 129 (Am. ed. 1914).
37. Mueller, supra note 2, at 552-53, says that before an ordinary man
would be half through a bed and board divorce action "his annual salary
would have been consumed-not leaving him a penny for bread and ale."
Moreover, the cost of an action for absolute divorce, after the 1857 Act,
was between £100 and £150, and "it took another eighty years until di-
vorce really became available to the common man." Mueller concludes
that the injustice involved in the case of Regina v. Hall, tried at Warwick,
Spring Assizes, 1845, before Maule, J., was the immediate cause for the en-
actment of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857.
Hall's wife had been a vagrant and a woman of the most evil de-
meanor, wherefor Hall left her. Meeting a maiden by the name of
Maria, he told her he was a bachelor, and soon they were married.
Mr. Justice Maule expressed his regret for the prisoner's ill fate, yet,
in passing on the sentence, he pointed out there was only one law for
the rich and poor. Hall should have gone to various courts to obtain
damages for adultery from his wife's (poor) paramour, then he should
have gone to the ecclesiastical courts to obtain a divorce a mensa et
thoro, then he could have gone to the House of Lords, to obtain a di-
vorce a vinculo, at a cost in excess of £1000. Poor Hall's weekly
wage was hardly in excess of £1. Hall was convicted.
Id. at 549 n.15. There is disagreement as to whether Hall was convicted
for his bigamy or for lying to Maria, and as to whether his penalty was
one day or three months in jail.
38. ASHTON, op. cit. supra note 31, at 26. See also POWELL, op. Cit.
supra note 19, at 28-37, and Mueller, supra note 2, at 547, 562, where
divorce by dissenting sects is discussed. There seems to be no doubt that
ministerial divorces were given for adultery, and probably for other causes
as well.
39. 13 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY Op ENGLISH LAW 268-69 (1952), es-
timates that the average Scotch divorce cost between £10 and £15. Other
estimates range between £15 and £30, depending upon whether the divorce
was undefended.
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substantially exceeds the number of divorces.4" We will now con-
sider some examples of what we have called "common law di-
vorce."
C. COMMON LAW DIVORCE
First of all, we are not concerned here with situations where
there has been resort to the courts and, due to lack of jurisdiction
or fraud and collusion, a judicial decree is void. Migratory divorces
and collusive decrees, widespread as they may be, are not within
our category of "common law divorce" even though indirectly they
may affect the incidence of informal divorce.41 The immediate
problem is private termination of marriage, independent of judicial
action, which may be relied upon by the parties as carrying with it
a privilege to remarry.
40. Rheinstein, supra note 16, at 652-53, demonstrates that desertion
and a successful disappearance by a spouse frequently occurs in the United
States at the present time. Over a million spouses disappear annually and
tracing them is a major portion of the business of private investigators.
There are various and conflicting figures on the desertion rate. However,
in 1955, there were 4,600,000 wives and children in cases where parents
were estranged and the father was not providing adequate support. Of that
number, there were 1,900,000 deserted wives; 1,500,000 deserted unwed
mothers with children, and 1,200,000 divorced or legally separated wives,
according to public assistance reports.
An analysis of the figures of the Social Security administration pro-
vides the startling information that there must be "at least 4 million
women and children deprived of care and support by husband and fa-
ther because of estrangement, exclusive of an unknown number of ad-
ditional children, not living with their mothers, who come from homes
broken by marital discord. . . . Desertion alone probably accounted
for payments of about $100,000,000 under the ADC program alone"
-so says Charles I. Schottland, U. S. Commissioner of Social Security.
Zukerman, The Role of the Public Agency With the Deserted Family, 15
PUBLIC WELFARE 101 (1957). The divorce rate in the United States stands
at about 400,000 divorces per year. It also should be noted that with the
exception of cruelty in its many forms, desertion is one of the most com-
mon statutory grounds for divorce.
41. Obviously, common knowledge of the machinations and peregrina-
tions of celebrities such as motion picture stars and people of great wealth
may affect the public image of marriage and domestic relations law. Mi-
gratory divorce historically was no problem in England due to the rule that
a foreign divorce of an English marriage would not be recognized unless
it was upon a ground recognized in England. Migratory marriage, on the
other hand, was a serious English problem after Lord Hardwicke's Act
in 1753. The blacksmith at Gretna Green thereafter became a famous
personage and elopement excursions to the Isles of Man and Guernsey a
regular offering. In the United States both migratory marriage and migra-
tory divorce have been serious problems due to our federated system and
the differences between the laws of the several states. It may be accepted
as a fact of life that undue severity, hardship, or inconvenience in the law
promotes out-of-state marriage and divorce and hence is largely self-de-
feating. Migratory divorce, however, is not unique to the United States. As
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Common law divorce may occur from private agreement, as
where the couple separates and agrees that each is free to go his
own way; or it may arise due to unilateral action, as where the
husband deserts the home. Desertion, the "poor man's form of di-
vorce," may vary in incidence depending upon several factors such
as economic conditions generally and of the family in particular,
the availability and practicality of a legal remedy such as a divorce
decree, and whether the particular marriage was of a common law
or ceremonial variety. Of course, the character and social class of
the parties and the intensity of their conflict also are matters of
great importance in the choice of a particular avenue of escape
from the marriage.
In addition to self-divorce by consent and divorce by desertion,
there are other examples of common law divorce that perhaps are
not quite so well known. For the most part, these varieties of self-
help have some sanction in custom, common understanding, gos-
sip, old wive's tales, or scuttlebutt, even though they are unrecog-
nized by law. Not infrequently the spouse of a convict, even
though the particular state does not have a civil death statute, as-
sumes freedom to remarry or does so after a particular length of
time without obtaining a divorce decree.42 There appears to be
considerable misunderstanding in this regard and a common as-
sumption of capacity to remarry.
The "magic seven"f is another popular superstition among peo-
ple of lower economic and social classes. The gossip is that after
living apart for seven years no divorce decree or annulment is nec-
essary and a remarriage will be valid.43 Perhaps the magic num-
ber "seven" is based upon a presumed death statute. To some ex-
tent, "living apart" grounds for divorce may be based on such
common understanding.44
pointed out by Rheinstein, "Copenhagen divorces" for a number of years
enjoyed popularity on the Continent and Brazilians frequently get illegal
but socially-acceptable divorces in Uruguay. Rheinstein, supra note 16, at
641-42.
42. In a few states, such as New York, there is a civil death statute
which permits the spouse of a convict to elect whether to terminate a mar-
riage, and a remarriage may be deemed such an election and constitute a
valid second marriage. See In the Matter of Lindewall, 287 N.Y. 347,
39 N.E.2d 907, (1942). But cf. Villalon v. Bowen, 70 Nev. 456, 273 P.2d
409 (1954), holding such remarriage invalid under Oregon civil death stat-
ute.
43. Remarriage in the Enoch Arden situation, or after it is shown that
the absent spouse was exposed to a specific peril or missing in action,
usually is held to be invalid if the absentee turns up unless a decree of pre-
sumed death is obtained. In some states this situation subjects the parties
to the second marriage to possible bigamy or adultery prosecutions.
44. The best argument for "living apart" as grounds for divorce (there
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Another form of extra-legal divorce is "lawyer's office divorce."
This may occur at any stage of the proceedings before a final di-
vorce decree. There are cases where, after signing the divorce com-
plaint, the client abandons the case and proceeds to remarry.45
More often, however, illegal remarriage occurs after the hearing
but before the effective date of the divorce decree. Since about
one-third of American divorce cases are abandoned before reach-
ing the hearing and decree stage,46 there may be a substantial
number of illegal second marriages after proceedings are initiated,
if we assume that reconciliation did not occur in all abandoned
cases. Although it is difficult to believe that counsel did not fully
advise his client in these cases as to the effective date of a divorce
decree, there is some evidence of popular understanding to the
effect that capacity to remarry is acquired upon initiation of di-
vorce proceedings and that the decree is merely a technical mat-
ter.4
7
Frequently remarriage occurs after a check on the departed
spouse reveals that he (or she) has remarried, is rumored to be
dead, or is in jail. The fact that the other party remarried may be
regarded as freeing the deserted spouse from marital bonds and
authorizing his remarriage. In some southern states there is a dual
standard based upon color. Among some Negroes, if the husband
has "gone to Georgia" the deserted wife assumes freedom to re-
marry. Perhaps in Georgia there is a comparable phrase signifying
the same thing when the husband deserts and leaves that state.
The most interesting and extreme example of extra-legal divorce
is the practice which has been observed in some counties of Geor-
gia. When Negro couples obtain a marriage license, the applica-
tion is filed in a "shoehole" or box. If they have a falling out, one
or both appear before the clerk and the old application is refiled in
are such statutes in some twenty states) is that it provides an honest ground
for divorce and eliminates the need of perjury or exaggeration while at
the same time giving some assurance that the marriage is dead. See Mc-
Curdy, Divorce-A Suggested Approach, 9 VAND. L. REv. 685 (1956),
where a strong case is made for the enactment of such grounds, which are
in effect in most European countries.
45. In addition, it is not unusual for a client when told that he or she
does not meet the requirements for divorce, to reply "But I can pay-
surely there must be some kind of decree you can get me! I don't care
how good it is!"
46. The estimate that one-third of American divorce cases are aban-
doned is based upon research which has been done in Maryland, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania, and assumes that such states are typical.
47. Mrs. Jordan, who supplied most of these examples of "common law
divorce," relates the story of Jackie, her client in several divorce cases,
who on three different occasions went out and remarried after testifying in
court but before the decree had become effective, despite counsel's careful
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another "shoehole" or box, and thereafter a new marriage license
may be issued to one or both.4" In addition, there have been in-
stances where clerks or persons at the courthouse tear up the old
marriage application and tell disgruntled and naive spouses that
such constitutes a divorce and that they are free to remarry.
4 9
Another curious custom which is said to have existed at one
time among American Negroes is that of "jumping over a broom."
The initial "jumping" signified a marriage of the couple, and if
they later decided to call it quits, each jumped backwards over the
broom. This reversal of ceremony is interesting because it is analo-
gous to the Roman diffarreatio which was the reverse ceremony
for confarreatio or the religious ceremony of marriage.
In the cases of "lawyer's office divorce" and "shoehole" divorce
there is a semblance of legality for the ignorant or credulous, and
rumor and gossip may deem such to be legally efficacious. Hence
these situations are not cases of pure self-help. In all of the above
examples of common law divorce there are popular misconceptions
widely held by members of certain social classes. There are many
different sources of misinformation, including social workers,
church workers, pre-law students, court clerks, government em-
ployees, and doctors, as well as neighbors and friends. Remar-
riage in these situations may carry no social stigma within the par-
ticular class. Also, it may be that for some purposes, such as work-
men's compensation awards or the ADC program, semi-legality is
all that it is necessary, and this in turn may influence popular mis-
understanding. In addition, the divergence between pleadings, tes-
timony, and the true facts of the case as known to the parties and
others, may be so great that it is small wonder that there are egregi-
ous misconceptions as to divorce law. Understandably, there is
confusion as to the law and the facts, which becomes enhanced by
gossip and repetition.
It is quite obvious that a major factor underlying popular ac-
ceptance of common law divorce is the existence of common law
description of the legal consequences of such action.
48. The story of shoeholes for marriage licenses in Georgia is a familiar
one to Legal Aid attorneys in Florida. Somewhat analogous to the "shoe-
hole" divorce may be the resumption of cohabitation by divorced couples.
Obviously, the latter practice may be with the intention of remarriage,
or on a trial basis, or may be regarded as meretricious. Pennsylvania,
which ordinarily takes the position that common law marriages are "to be
tolerated and not encouraged," in Wagner Estate, 398 Pa. 531, 159 A.2d
495 (1960), distinguished a common law remarriage of a divorced couple
and held that public policy favored such remarriages, even though entered
into with common law informality.
49. Information as to these practices was supplied by Virginia S. Jordan
of Tampa, Florida. See note 4 supra.
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or self-marriage in many of the states where self-divorce assumes
forms other than desertion. Alabama, District of Columbia, Flori-
da, Georgia, and South Carolina are among the fifteen states re-
taining common law marriage, and the instances of common law
divorce cited herein are taken from experience and observation in
Florida and Georgia. It may be a reasonable hypothesis that in-
formality in contracting marriage engenders informality in termi-
nating marriage; that parties naturally may assume that if they
could "do it themselves" in entering into marriage, then "do it
yourself" was permissible and legal for ending the relationship.
More realistic, however, is the premise that in most of these cases
marriage was never intended, that in fact the parties contemplated
a liaison of indefinite duration in lieu of marriage and as distin-
guished from transient promiscuity. Their understanding all along
was that if things became intolerable or unpleasant, each was free
to seek greener pastures.
Several years ago Dr. Johnson of Fisk University wrote a paper
on "Negro Personality Changes" in which he described different
types of sexual unions and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of chil-
dren produced by parties to such relationships.50 The culture he
describes accepted the children of common law marriages (appar-
ently meaning a more or less permanent but non-legal relationship)
as fully legitimate. Children who were born of sexual unions for
pleasure were called "stolen children" and were regarded by some
mothers as "the best." A woman with children, who had been
married but later separated from her husband, might add other
children to her family, the latter being referred to as "children by
the way." There were also children who resulted from philander-
ing by young men who "make foolments" on young girls. These
generally were condemned by the community and usually placed
with other relatives. In time, however, they became indistinguish-
able from other members of the family. Community regard for
these various types of sexual unions and the children produced
thereby was wholly apart from any legal dichotomy between legi-
timate and illegitimate children and upper class notions of sin.
"Being closed out" for debt or practicing certain forms of birth
control carried greater social stigma than illegitimacy and although
the community church might regard illegitimacy as "a sin of the
mother," it was not serious unless accompanied by other "sins"
such as card playing or "frolicking."
Although the above description may be passe for most of Ameri-
50. Johnson, Negro Personality Changes in a Southern Community in
RAcE AND CuLTruE CONTACTS, 208, 217-18 (Reuter ed. 1934).
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ca in the 1960's, and more and more Negroes, both southern and
northern, emulate the mores and standards of the comparable white
social class, the fact remains that it is a good example of the gap
which frequently occurs between custom and law. Whether or not
the distinctions enumerated reflect corresponding differences in
the analogous white culture is not pertinent to our present inquiry.
If we try to discern the causes for self-help in contracting and
terminating marriage we may be forced to elect between subscrib-
ing to the view that it is the depravity and perversity of man that
occasions the gap between law and custom, or adopt the sociologi-
cal perspective that it is the law which is out of step with the
times and should be changed or modified to comport with current
needs and demands. Perhaps there is some merit in each view.
The fact remains, however, that our law of marriage and divorce
for the most part has devolved from the canon law of churchmen
rather than lawyers. That is an important historical fact because
law as a craft inculcates the art of compromise whereas theology
unrealistically may insist upon maintaining dogma at all cost.
Since lawyers took over the administration of church-made law
there has been amelioration of its severity by the employment of
divers legal techniques. The use of presumptions is a familiar ex-
ample. Estoppel and res judicata are other examples. Regardless
of what the true facts may be, the validity of a marriage or re-
marriage may be presumed,5 or an attack upon a theoretically
void divorce decree may be foreclosed.5" Fictions also may be em-
ployed. In such ways the law officially countenances or tolerates
informal, illegal, extra-legal, or even void marriages and divorces.
The danger in all this-as there must be when we try to have
our cake and eat it too-is what Max Rheinstein has called a
"Gresham's Law of divorce." He says:
In the field of divorce it can be said with equal certainty that when-
ever it is possible for divorce seekers to obtain divorces with some dif-
ficulty in one place and with greater ease or speed in another, cases
tend to accumulate in the place of easy, and to dry up in the place of
hard divorce.53
In other words, cases accumulate in a Nevada or Alabama. One
might add that annulment acquires popularity where divorce is
51. For an example, see Spears v. Spears, 178 Ark. 720, 12 S.W.2d
875 (1928). See also Annot., 34 A.L.R. 464 (1925), and Note, 30 HAnv.
L. REv. 500 (1917), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 287(1950).
52. For a lengthy discussion of estoppel, res judicata, and the exclusion
rule, see Foster, Domestic Relations and Something About Res Judicata,
22 U. PrrT. L. REV. 313 (1960).
53. Rheinstein, supra note 16, at 641.
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difficult, and for those who cannot afford the fare to Reno, or a
New York annulment based upon fraud, the practical alternative
may be self-divorce or desertion. Moreover, the extensive publicity
given to irregular divorces obtained by celebrities, such as those
procured in Mexico by mail order or otherwise, together with the
fact that the parties to void or invalid decrees seldom are prose-
cuted or brought to account, demonstrates to the common man that
law is not to be taken too seriously and can be evaded in other
ways as well.54 Where there is little in the way of property to
worry about, and where it is known that adultery and fornication
laws are almost never enforced, the law tends to become academic
and remote and only the pressure of one's church or one's neigh-
bors may impede private action based upon personal needs. Mi-
gratory marriages and migratory divorces on the one hand have
debased legal institutions, and on the other hand they confirm the
cynical observation that love or hate will find a way.
The reports of anthropologists indicate that in most cultures
some approved form of escape from an impossible marriage is
recognized. Divorce by mutual consent is common. Divorce at
the will of the husband is typical of patriarchal societies and at
the will of the wife in matriarchal societies. There are but few in-
stances where marriage in both theory and practice is indissol-
uble,5 although it is not uncommon for social or other sanctions
54. Judge Ploscowe, in SEX AND THE LAW, 155-57 (1951), reports that in
1948 there were the following number of arrests for adultery in the city
indicated: Baltimore 3, Wilmington 16, Los Angeles 4, Duluth 2, and Bos-
ton 242. During the same year there were 248 arrests for fornication in
Boston, but none in the other cities listed above. Student research using
Shepard's Citator system, turned up only a couple of Williams type bigamous
cohabitation decisions in the appellate courts since Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). Unquestionably, prosecutions are so rare as to be
virtually non-existent.
55. HowARD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 228-29, says that in theory at
least, marriages are indissoluble among the Papuas of New Guinea, the
Veddahs of Ceylon, and the Niassers of Batu. 3 WESTERMARCK, THE HIs-
TORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE 268-70, 301, 304 (5th ed. 1921), adds some
additional peoples, including the Aztecs of Mexico and orthodox Hindus.
Both authors, however, note that indissoluble marriage is the exception
rather than the rule. Frequently divorce is most informal, as among the
Zuni Indians where a wife divorces a husband simply by placing his be-
longings at the entrance to the lodgings. A Cheyenne brave could dispose
of a squaw by a "drum divorce" during an Omaha dance while other
braves sang the "throw-away" song, or he might abandon her by "putting
her on the prairie." The Todas of south India permitted husbands to divorce
for cause, the grounds being "(1) she won't work, or (2) she is a fool." A
counterpart to alimony under modem American law may be found among
some cultures such as the Ifuagos of the Phillipines. So-called "proof mar-
riages," which may be terminated at will if no children are produced, are
quite common among preliterate people, and the Eskimo of the Ungave
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to be imposed for unfair or unwarranted unilateral divorce. 6
For example, the economic consequence of exercising a privilege
of divorce may be such that the freedom is illusory." Since mar-
riage is an event commonly seized upon as a means of transferring
property, and wives and children may be economic assets, it is not
surprising that such economic factors often are reflected in law,
religion, and custom as they pertain to marriage and divorce.5"
Thus, typically a middle ground is chosen between unrestricted
divorce and indissolubility, and social control of some sort is im-
posed to regulate the dissolution of marriage. In theory, such a
middle position is subscribed to in the United States, although in
practice divorce is by consent in most states if the parties have
agreed upon the terms of settlement. A few Catholic countries in
Europe and South America deny divorce altogether.59 At the oth-
er extreme, the Soviet Union, for a few years, permitted divorce by
registration by one party.6" Under Moslem law the husband may
divorce at will by thrice repeating the formula "I divorce thee."
Public divorce on specified grounds is recognized by most religions
although divorce decrees may be given only limited effect among
Catholics, Hindus, and Orthodox Jews.61
It would be too much to claim that the ubiquity of divorce re-
flects the wisdom of the species. As noteworthy as its preva-
lence is the frequency of its limitation and regulation by law and
religion. If we may generalize at all, perhaps the most we can say
district and some North American Indians and West African Negroes con-
tract marriages only for a short term.
56. The Code of Hammurabi seems to provide that if a husband divorced
his wife without just cause he was required to forfeit one mina of silver.
Justinian in Rome imposed severe penalties, including exile, for unwarrant-
ed divorce. Among the Teutonic peoples, the husband's original unlimited
right to divorce in time was regulated and curbed. Among primitive people,
severe sanctions may be imposed for unwarranted divorce. See WESTER-
MARCK, op. cit. supra note 55, at 293, 317, 367 et seq, and HowARD, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 243-44, 249.
57. In primitive cultures, where there is a "bride price" or affinal ex-
change, termination of the marriage may require return of all property re-
ceived by the parties or their relatives upon their marriage. Naturally, this
serves as a potent economic pressure against divorce.
58. See BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CuLTURE 32, 224-25 (Mentor Book
ed. 1957).
59. Italy, Spain, Eire, and Andorra forbid divorce to all residents, and
in Liechenstein and Portugal divorce is forbidden to Catholics. Brazil for-
bids all divorce.
60. See Gsovski, Marriage and Divorce in Soviet Law, 35 GEo. L.J. 209
(1947).
61. It is interesting that in Israel civil divorce is not recognized and only
a Rabbinical decree will be treated as valid. See Laufer, Marital Law in
Transition: The Problem in Israel, 9 BuFFA.o L. REv. 321 (1960).
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is that both marriage and divorce are significant social events and
matters of public concern. It is this dual aspect of individual and
social interest which inevitably gives rise to conflicts and gaps be-
tween law and private practice. Specific performance of the mar-
riage contract, although it has been tried, is not a likely remedy. 2
In our own society, if divorce is not obtainable with relative ease,
or if it is too expensive, the result will not be a continuation of the
family unit intact, but rather a resort to some form of self-help or
to those practices we have included within the term "common
law divorce."
CONCLUSION
From the standpoint of history one may discern a continuing
struggle between man and authority over the institutions of mar-
riage and divorce. The struggle persists because marriage has both
private and public aspects and is the legitimate concern of the par-
ties, the state, and religion. Perhaps Rome is the classical example
of this conflict of values. From what appears to have been a di-
vorceless society, at least where the couple were joined by confar-
reatio under the manus system, marriage and divorce eventually
were secularized and became a matter of purely private contract.6 3
The wife who had been subject to her husband's control under
the patriarchal system acquired equal rights, after centuries of so-
cial evolution, to divorce at will. With the advent of Christianity,
church and state control over marriage and divorce was re-estab-
lished. In England between 1086 and 1857 ecclesiastical courts
(subject to acts of Parliament after the Reformation) developed a
strict law of divorce. But the law was only the top of the iceberg.
Beneath the surface there was the greater part, comprising custom,
usage, needs, and desires. For great masses of the people the law
for barons, gentlemen, and persons of substance, was remote if
not non-existent. To a lesser extent, the same holds true today in
our own culture.
62. Although English law formerly recognized an action by a spouse for
restoration of conjugal rights, an action in the nature of specific perform-
ance of the marriage contract, such actions have never been recognized
in the United States. MADDEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW oF PERSONS AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 148 (1931).
63. BRYcE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 842-43, summarizes the evolution
of Roman matrimonial law. It is interesting to note that Justinian disap-
proved of dissolving marriages by mutual consent but his grandson Justin
restored that ancient law. The latter observed that it was difficult to recon-
cile those who hated each other violently, and who, if they were compelled
to live together, frequently made attempts on each other's lives. The wis-
dom of Justin has been lost in the pages of antiquity.
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Much of the confusion may stem from the social fact that there
are three different, but at times overlapping, relationships which
the law tends to treat as but two. Sexual unions may be (1) promis-
cuous, (2) of a more or less permanent nature, or (3) there may
be a regular or common law marriage. Our law and mores agree
that promiscuity does not create legal status or semblance of hus-
band and wife. The second category, however, is ambiguous and
confusing since, unlike the Romans, we do not recognize concubi-
nage. Large segments of our society, and most often the parties
themselves, do not view a more or less permanent liaison as mar-
riage and, as often as not, marriage clearly is neither intended nor
desired. However, parties to such a union may call one another
"common law husband" or "common law wife." Usually, this is
what is meant by "common law marriage." The courts on the oth-
er hand, reserve the terms "common law" wife, husband, and mar-
riage, for the informally created but legally effective relationship of
marriage. Common law marriage, in the social as distinguished
from the legal sense, is both acceptable and proper in many states,
including those which now require licenses for valid marriage.
Where the "common law divorce" to which we have referred
terminates a common law marriage in the non-legal sense, one
cannot quarrel with such a severence of a legal nullity. But where
self-help is employed to terminate the legal status of marriage
(whether the marriage itself was formal or informal), serious prob-
lems arise. It is clear that unless divorce is relatively inexpensive,
desertion and self-divorce are bound to occur. The same is true
where divorce is difficult. Perhaps it would not matter so much if
only the parties themselves were involved or would suffer, but in
an age of pensions, workmen's compensation, public assistance,
ADC, insurance, and a plethora of other welfare legislation, chil-
dren, relatives, and others are affected by the legal status of a given
couple. In some measure the problem may be mitigated by statu-
tory reform of the law pertaining to legitimacy and legitimation.
In the last analysis, however, what is needed is a realistic and
practical law of divorce so that resort to the law will be more at-
tractive than self-help."' The law, to serve adequately as a substi-
64. For a convincing plea for the wholesale reform of the substantive
and procedural law of divorce, see Alexander, The Family Court: An Ob-
stacle Race, 19 U. PrrT. L. REV. 602 (1958), which is but one of Judge
Alexander's many articles on the subject. For a popular treatment of the sub-ject, see David G. Wittels, Perjury Unlimited, Sat. Evening Post, Feb. 18,
1950, pp. 28, 136, where it is reported that one Cleveland judge han-
dles as many as fifty divorce cases a day and that it was possible to get a
divorce "without either of the marriage partners ever appearing before a
judge . . .without witnesses . . .without presentation of a shred of evi-
1961]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tute for self-help, must be responsive to the needs of litigants and
their families and recognize that no social gain is achieved by de-
nying divorce when a marriage is in fact dead.
In conclusion, we may note that this cursory and perhaps super-
ficial examination of "common law divorce" is based upon limited
experience and casual observation. Perhaps some meaningful data
could be compiled indicating the extent and scope of the problem
if Legal Aid societies throughout the United States could be per-
suaded to compile sociological data and information which would
show the "living law" of marriage and divorce. As has been said,
we suspect that our courts have seen but the top of the iceberg.
There is no doubt that common law divorce is as prevalent as
common law marriage, whatever we mean by each term, and that
common law divorces (including desertions) substantially exceed
in number the sum total of divorce decrees. The theme song seems
to be: "Anything you can do, I can do better." It is submitted that
the "do it yourself" craze has been carried too far and that the
judge should be a necessary and even interested party to divorce
proceedings.
dence that a divorce is justified." The classic criticisms of divorce proced-
ure are those of Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TULANE
L. REV. 377 (1937), and Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 COLUM.
L. REV. 1281 (1932), 33 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1933). Helpful books about
the problem include BURKE, WITH THIS RINo (1958); GOODE, AFTER
DIVORCE (1956); PLOSCOWE, THE TRUTH ABOUT DIVORCE (1955); Gell-
horn, Children and Families in the Courts of New York City, REPORT BY
A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASS'N OF BAR OF CITY OF NEW YORK (1954);
VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES IN COURT (1956); and ERNST & LOATH, FOR BET-
TER OR WORSE (1951).
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